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The 
political and social 
outlook for 
Latin America 
Torcuato Di Telia* 
Taking a down-to-earth view of the probable evolution 
of the main economic conditioning factors affecting 
the countries of the region, especially the external 
debt, the author sketches the broad outlines of a 
strategy for stimulating medium- and long-term de-
velopment. As regards the external debt he forecasts 
an increasingly conflictive situation, to the point at 
which its seriousness will lead to the acceptance of 
more flexible proposals by the creditor banks and 
countries. The conflicts will themselves hasten the his-
torical process and help to generate the situations and 
actors that will strive to relieve the present stifling 
situation. 
Against this background, the Latin American 
countries must reorient their economic development 
along the path of industrialization, protection and 
planning already pointed out by some of them in the 
1930s. This implies an emphasis on State intervention 
and on the improvement of its efficiency, the mobiliza-
tion of idle resources, the orientation of production 
towards activities which will help to raise techno-
productive, scientific, social and cultural levels, the 
s t r e n g t h e n i n g of d e m o c r a t i c systems and the 
reinforcement of regional co-operation. This last 
should not be conceived solely on the economic and 
financial plane, although this may be very important; 
the coming years call for a profound climate of solidar-
ity in Latin America leading to collective measures 
which will sustain and express the power of the region 
as a whole. 




The looming catastrophe 
The medium-term political and social outlook 
for Latin America is heavily conditioned by the 
present constraints produced by the external 
debt. These can only be surmounted by the ex-
ceptional expansion of output and exports, or by 
the collective and radical renegotiation of the 
terms of the payment of the debt, including sub-
stantial reductions in interest rates. The adop-
tion of either of these solutions would result in a 
series of vicious circles, however, since on the one 
hand an increase in production and exports re-
quires a capacity for accumulation which is pre-
cisely what is blocked by the servicing of the debt. 
The use of massive contributions of foreign 
capital would involve heavy remittances of prof-
its; besides, this solution to the problem would 
imply such a heavy sacrifice of resources that it 
would provoke insuperable political reactions. 
On the other hand, collective and radical 
renegotiation of the terms of the debt calls for a 
political capacity that the region does not possess, 
largely because of the weakness of its national 
economies, destabilized as they are by their 
straitened financial circumstances (Hill and 
Tomassini, 1982; Jaguaribe, 1982; Villanueva, 
1980). 
The situation is so grave that it raises the 
question of possible resort to extreme solutions. 
One of these is recolonization, which would have 
to be accompanied by authoritarian political sys-
tems, since public opinion would not voluntarily 
accept it. The other is a defiant repudiation of 
the debt obligations, which would generate re-
volutionary and very probably also authoritarian 
conditions, although in the opposite direction. If 
one considers that the crisis situation is likely to 
persist year after year for an unpredictable pe-
riod, and if one thinks of the score or so of re-
latively large Third World countries character-
ized by high political instability, a mere calcula-
tion of probabilities leads to the conclusion that 
the time will come when some political elite will 
decide —as in the case of the Falklands in-
vasion— to break the rules of the game. This 
denouement, if it occurs in a small country, may 
be absorbable by the international Financial sys-
tem without problems. If, on the other hand, it 
happens in a larger country, its impact will be 
very great. Perhaps it may not be as disastrous for 
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the financial system of the North as is sometimes 
believed, but it will certainly cause commotion 
and will call for a massive intervention by the 
States of that part of the world to save the system. 
Moreover, a situation of this type will involve a 
conflict between the defaulting country and the 
guardians of international order which might 
cause the outbreak of war —once again of the 
Falklands type, but not necessarily with a similar 
outcome and with possible international com-
plications between the great blocs. Of course in 
this case it would be the taxpayer, who today is so 
often described as being unwilling to meet the 
costs of a radical renegotiation of the debt, who 
would have to pay the damages, perhaps even 
without realizing it. Although the North might 
be able to prevail in such an eventuality, it would 
do so at too great a cost both in lives or war 
material and in bank failures, to say nothing of its 
loss of prestige and credibility in its role as di-
rector of the international order. For the Third 
World country that took the line of default the 
consequences would also be serious, and would 
make its action far from advisable in the light of a 
cold analysis of the advan tages and dis-
advantages involved. But political decisions are 
not taken in this way, as the countries of the 
North undoubtedly realize, since they are well 
acquainted with their own history (Calcagno, 
Sáinz and de Barbieri, 1972; Lechner, 1981; 
González, 1981). 
This may seem an excessively alarmist pros-
pect, and it certainly would be so if such a course 
were explicitly proposed. But it is highly prob-
able that events of this type will take place within 
the period of 15 to 20 years considered in this 
paper, since it is unrealistic to suppose that the 
Third World countries —with one or two ex-
ceptions— will be able to solve their present dif-
ficulties in this lapse of time. The temptation to 
break away will continue, therefore, to hover on 
their horizons, firing the imagination of one or 
ano the r of their leading elites or counter-
elites. Put in another way, this is very much in line 
with Henry Kissinger's declarations in the sense 
that, if our institutions are not sufficiently con-
solidated, our kind of countries could give rise to 
new revolutionary leaders. 
Far from being alarmist, however, the out-
look may even be considered as moderately good 
if one thinks of events like those that accompa-
nied the independence of India, the wars in Bia-
fra, Bangladesh, Iran and Iraq, or the Cultural 
Revolution of China or Cambodia. It is true that 
in Latin America the economic and social con-
ditions are on the whole less distressing than in 
the greater part of the Third World, but there 
are still extensive regions, and even entire 
countries, where the standard of living is close to 
the subsistence level. Moreover, the constraints 
caused by the public debt apply to all, and we 
cannot be sure that even the more prosperous 
regions, once they enter into crisis, will not be the 
scene of political phenomena which are equally 
or more extreme, albeit of a somewhat different 
type. Besides, even if the breakaway does not 
occur in Latin America, its results will make 
themselves felt in this area. 
It is also foreseeable that in the medium term 
there will be a serious crisis of the economic poli-
cy pursued by the present United States Govern-
ment. The aim of this policy is to offset the de-
ficits on the budget and external trade by heavy 
public indebtedness and imports of capital, both 
associated with high interest rates. The resultant 
strengthening of the dollar makes it more dif-
ficult to close the external gap, while the interest 
rates depress the productive sector, even though 
they may achieve partial results in reducing infla-
tion. The euphoria, and the consequent backing 
by United States public opinion, cannot last long, 
because a simple numerical calculation indicates 
that sooner or later the apparent remedies be-
come part of the disease. The flows of foreign 
capital begin to generate contrary currents of 
financial services, the Government's public debt 
must be paid at least in respect of its interest, and 
businesses finally crack beneath the weight of 
their banking commitments. Of course, the 
theory behind this policy is that all this reorga-
nizes the productive factors through the dis-
cipline of the market, and makes the United 
States economy once again internationally com-
petitive. But it is precisely this excessive con-
fidence in the virtues of the market that will 
prove unjustified in the not-too-distant future. 
The crisis will then demand —as happened at the 
beginning of the 1930s— a New Deal that will 
confer on the State a more dynamic inter-
ventionist role, particularly in its control of the 
financial system. Just as there has been heavy 
intervention in the banking system in Europe 
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—more for ideological reasons in France, more 
for practical reasons in Spain— something sim-
ilar is foreseeable in the United States. The pres-
sure of international debtors will be joined by 
that of the local producers themselves, some of 
them transnational in dimension. The current 
equivalent of a Marshall Plan cannot consist of 
unilateral hand-outs or of the mass promotion of 
exports of capital from the centre to the periph-
ery. It must consist, basically, of intervention in 
and control of the international financial system, 
involving a radical reduction in the real values of 
existing credits. This, as will be argued later on, 
must be accompanied by the stabilization of the 
prices of the basic export products of the Third 
World, with a trend towards higher values than 
the present ones, all of this stimulated by some 
scheme —politically motivated— along the lines 
Of OPEC. 
To sum up, there is a first hypothesis to be 
put forward, namely, that one or more break-
aways from the rules of the international game 
are going to occur in the next twenty years, with 
serious warlike complications, and this will be-
come increasingly probable as time goes on un-
less other solutions are found. Pursuing this ex-
ploration in the future, we may add a second 
hypothesis, according to which the tendency of 
the governments of the North to take a hand in 
the financial system will gradually increase. Un-
fortunately, one or more traumatic events will be 
needed to induce these governments to adopt the 
measures required, which will injure powerful 
vested interests but which will be necessary for 
the maintenance of their own social systems and 
their international role. 
Metaphor i ca l speaking , a first rec-
ommendation for action deriving from this 
analysis might be to wait for some "bullock" to 
cross the river of default and, while the piranhas 
devour it, take advantage of the confusion or the 
changed circumstances to cross in force as soon 
as possible, avoiding the voracious fish, which 
would most likely be called to moderation in the 
meantime by the river-god (the most influential 
capitalist circles). Although it may not be con-
sidered in good taste to recommend this kind of 
behaviour, it is probable that this is what will 
actually happen in the end by the mere force of 
circumstances, without anyone's proposing it. In 
any case, it is neither possible nor advisable to 
remain passively awaiting events: something 
must be done in the meantime, even though it 
may be a question of exercises which, though 
they will not give much benefit while the 
piranhas are patrolling the river, will neverthe-
less leave more room for manoeuvre on the day 
when things may change. 
Abandoning metaphors, the position is that 
there are a number of moderate, or gradualist, 
strategies which for the moment, in face of the 
harsh conditions of the indebtedness dilemma, 
do not hold out much hope of great results, but 
which might be successful in a different in-
ternational setting. Let us, in fact, return to the 
two (non-extreme) methods of overcoming the 
existing constraints which were put forward at 
the beginning. One was the increase of output 
and exports and the other the renegotiation of 
the financial burden. Increasing exports involves 
greater access to the markets of the developed 
world, which are today firmly closed as soon as 
there is any serious competition with local pro-
ducers. When the predicted breakaway has taken 
place it will be easier—perhaps not for the coun-
try that takes the plunge, which will be 
"punished", but certainly for the others— to 
obtain adjustments in this field. And the same 
will occur as regards financial renegotiation. 
Something similar will happen on an in-
ternational scale to that which took place in the 
advanced industrial economies with regard to 
the relations between capital and labour. Com-
pared with the danger of revolution —experi-
enced directly or indirectly— unionism will no 
longer seem a lesser evil, but rather a positive 
good. Thus, just as today some sociologists say 
that strong trade-unionism is the chief barrier 
against revolution, the day may come when the 
debtors' clubs are organized from Wall Street. 
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II 
The need for an interventionist State 
Latin America lacks capital, yet at the same time it 
has idle capital. It is short of trained technicians, 
but it has technicians without employment. It 
needs skilled workmen, but it has them largely 
underemployed, thus wasting their skills. 
Moreover, it has an abundance of unskilled 
labour, both urban and rural, which seeks op-
portunities without finding them and forms a 
marginal mass. It cannot be expected that mere 
market forces or international capital move-
ments will correct this situation. What is needed 
is intervention by the State, compatible in varying 
degrees —according to the conditions of each 
country— with the complementary and still im-
portant role of the market forces. State interven-
tion, notwithstanding, is not a panacea, and is 
frequently a hindrance to the productive forces if 
it is not performed with efficiency. The fact is 
that in this field there are simply no panaceas, 
either of the free-market or of the controlled-
economy type. The mobilization of national re-
sources calls for the solution of a complex equa-
tion with many variables, taking into account the 
requisites both of private and of State enterprise, 
of the market and of planning, of technocracy 
and of the participation of interested parties. 
It is sometimes said that in our countries the 
State is such a bad administrator, so corrupt, or 
so permeable to political influences in conflict 
with efficiency, that it is better to reduce its role to 
the minimum, removing it not only from the area 
of production but also from that of planning. 
Expressed in these extreme terms, this argument 
is too ideological and by no means valid, because 
although a badly administered State is capable of 
committing appalling errors, a market left to it-
self can do much worse, as was demonstrated by 
the crisis of the 1930s —with its sequels of fascism 
and war— and several other earlier cases. In 
most of the countries of the area it will be neces-
sary to seek combinations between State and pri-
vate enterprise. But the State must be converted 
into an efficient instrument, with its sectors more 
isolated from the pressures of party politics than 
is the case at present. There is a need not only for 
a bureaucracy, but also for a technocracy with its 
own functional requisites —for example, as re-
gards salaries and career structure— and with its 
own areas of competence which even the pop-
ularly elected powers must respect. This means 
that most public posts, from the lowest to the 
highest —except some directly designated as 
political posts— should be assured of stability, 
and should only be open to specially trained per-
sonnel. Only very great changes in our political 
and party systems will enable this new public 
administration to be created. Perhaps the process 
will take more than the coming 20 years which 
are under analysis here, but it needs to be put 
forward as a definite proposition now. 
Until this new State, efficient and honest, 
comes into being, it will be difficult to pian our 
resources with success. If the continuance of the 
present inefficient State were considered inevi-
table, the ultra-liberal solution of entrusting 
everything to the market would be more toler-
able. But it would be over-pessimistic to resign 
ourselves to this limitation, and if on this basis all 
attempts to use the powers of the State were 
abandoned, our dependent condition would be-
come permanent. It may however be granted 
—although it is a controversial topic— that the 
State is not an adequate direct organizer of pro-
duction of most of the goods and services re-
quired by a modern country. Its limitations stem 
not only from arguments of efficiency but also 
from the impact of such a monopoly on public 
liberties. But it is quite a different matter to 
assign to the State an important interventionist 
role in the creation of the broad parameters or 
rules of the game within which the economic 
actors move and to grant it a function, through 
quasi-autonomous ministries or enterprises, in 
certain areas of production. 
Both the example of the United States and 
that of Western Europe show that this can be 
done in conditions of efficiency and freedom. In 
the case of Latin America the weakness of the 
entrepreneurial elements will require an expan-
sion of the role of the State. Since the State we 
have is inefficient, however, another vicious cir-
cle is created here, through the need to employ a 
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badly designed instrument. But there is no 
alternative, and its continuous use should pro-
vide the experience to improve it. If we were so 
influenced by the inefficiency of the State that we 
decided to put much more reliance on local or 
transnational entrepreneurs, even more vicious 
circles would be created. 
The local entrepreneurs are just as full of 
defects as the State, and in the dog-eat-dog situa-
tion which characterizes our economies they 
have no option but to act with excessive in-
dividualism and speculation. The foreign (trans-
national) enterprises may sometimes give an 
appearance of more stable activity, with greater 
resources and more continuity of objectives, but 
it would be anti-national and courting Balkaniza-
tion to rely mainly on them. Some oft-quoted 
examples of their role, as in the countries of 
Southeast Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore) are not relevant, because 
there the State has a supremely directive func-
tion, especially in the two largest mentioned, not 
to speak of Japan (Fajnzylber, 1983; Fishlow and 
others, 1980; Chenery and others, 1974). The 
secret of success in these countries does not lie in 
the (non-existent) transnational paradise they 
are sometimes claimed to offer, nor in the au-
thoritarianism with which they are governed or 
have been governed in the past, but in their 
characteristic strong social solidarity. This social 
solidarity, which gives priority to national and 
productive objectives over sectoral or distributive 
aims, is the result of their peculiar historical 
evolution. Its effects on their mode of life and 
public liberties are complex, and not readily 
acceptable to broad sectors in countries which, 
The State —progressively consolidated in the 
manner indicated— should facilitate the use of 
the idle resources in the region. One way of do-
ing this is to help to create a larger economic area 
through the unification of markets, whether at 
the overall Latin American level —a somewhat 
remote objective— or through subregional 
like those of Latin America, have lived through 
long periods of enjoyment (albeit only partial) of 
public liberties and reaffirmed individualism. It 
is not easy to change these Latin American attrib-
utes, although it would do us no harm to show a 
little more social solidarity: that is, a lessening of 
the intensity of conflicts between social classes, 
pressure groups, and other corporative sectors. 
But this greater solidarity is generally based, to 
judge from historical experience —on the ac-
quiescence or passivity of the popular classes. In 
most of the Latin American countries these pop-
ular sectors are not disposed to contribute so 
humbly to national solidarity; and the upper stra-
ta would have to make too many sacrifices —as 
they see them in terms of their values and ex-
pectations— to be able on their side to help to 
create this solidarity. It is not realistic to expect 
either of these two things to happen, so that for 
good or ill the outlook for our continent is the 
continuation of situations of scant solidarity and 
hence of little social legitimacy for the existing 
hierarchical structures, including private or 
public enterprises, scientific and technical in-
stitutions, and political entities. If we had the per 
capita product of Western Europe or the United 
States we might, despite what has been said, cre-
ate a situation of greater solidarity and legitima-
cy. It so happens, however, that we have a large 
dose of the individualism and sectorialism of 
those countries, but not their resources, and this 
accounts for the peculiar bellicosity and tensions 
of our political confrontations. What is needed is 
to recognize this fact and to adapt both our in-
stitutions and the mentality of our controlling 
groups to the creation of solid institutional struc-
tures in these conditions. 
groupings such as the Andean Group. These 
subregional groupings, possibly restricted to cer-
tain industries and to countries which are nearer 
together or whose economies are already more 
associated, are easier to bring about, because they 
involve a smaller number of actors. These actors 
comprise the respective States, entrepreneurial 
III 
The mobilization of idle resources 
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groups and trade unions; furthermore, as a 
dynamic element, the political parties and ideolo-
gical groups must also be taken into account 
here. The unification of markets, like any other 
economic phenomenon, is really a political pro-
cess, which must transcend the purely corpora-
tive element to be successful. The Andean Group 
is a good example, and this was especially so at 
the time of its formation, when the central role 
was played by the Christian Democratic Parties 
which were ruling in Venezuela and Chile and 
had affinities with the Conservative Parties of 
Colombia and Ecuador. Among the popular 
parties of this region the strong links between 
Democratic Action of Venezuela and the APRA 
(American People's Revolutionary Alliance) of 
Peru are well-known; they are influenced by the 
Social Democratic Party and have affinities with 
Colombian liberalism and the Revolutionary 
Nationalist Movement of Bolivia. Another ex-
ample of this type of grouping restricted to a few 
countries and also to only a couple of industries 
is the European Steel and Coal Community, 
launched a little after the Second World War and 
embracing productive sectors with large con-
centrations of private and State entrepreneurs. 
The coincidence of views of the Christian De-
mocrat governments of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France and Italy, along whit this par-
ty's participation in the cabinets of the Benelux 
countries, facilitated this project. The Social De-
mocratic movement, albeit more reservedly, also 
supported this plan, although at the union level it 
was only strong in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and the Benelux countries. The Com-
munist parties of France and Italy did not favour 
this attempt at capitalist planning, especially ow-
ing to their general position at that time, which 
was much more challenging than the attitude 
they assumed later. 
T h e European Common Market owed much 
to that first experiment in limited co-operation 
among six countries (in practice, four units, since 
Benelux was regarded as a unified entity). In its 
turn, the Common Market itself went on slowly 
expanding on the basis of that small initial num-
ber of associates, after the failure of some other 
projects such as the European Free Trade 
Association sponsored by Great Britain and a 
number of peripheral countries. The ambivalent 
position of Great Britain, hesitating between con-
tinuing its relations with the Commonwealth or 
deciding to throw in its lot with Europe, has so far 
hampered its fuller incorporation into the Eu-
ropean economic project. Moreover, the popular 
parties —not only in England— have continuing 
doubts as to the expediency of participating in 
this supra-national planning, which, owing to the 
nature of the political forces in play, cannot fail to 
give more weight to the capitalist sectors of the 
countries concerned than is possible within 
national boundaries in situations more favour-
able to a socialist evolution. But the advantages 
—economic as well as political and cultural (and 
to a certain extent also military)— of the uni-
fication of markets are in the long run overcom-
ing resistance. Within a larger economic area it is 
likewise feasible to adopt certain protectionist 
measures of a clearly strategic nature (such as 
those designed to ensure food self-sufficiency) 
which would be considered excessively onerous, 
if not impossible, at the national level. All these 
aspects are examples of the close interweaving of 
economic motivations and factors with ideologi-
cal or political considerations that lies behind a 
plan for the unification of markets. The mobility 
of labour that this implies is also facilitated, in this 
case, by the similarity in the level of social and 
cultural development achieved by these coun-
tries. The fact of having begun with a few State 
and private actors whose historical experience 
led them to make radical innovations in their 
former practices in order to survive is also an 
element in their success. 
This experience suggests that in the next two 
decades or so the best strategy for Latin America 
will not lie along the lines of LAFTA or ALADI, and 
much less in the search for a common market for 
the whole region —not because such measures 
would be undesirable, but because of their im-
practicability. Although ALADI can provide a 
frame of reference, it will be more rewarding to 
attempt to bolster up the Andean Group, or 
revitalize similar groupings in Central America 
or the Caribbean. In the southern part of the 
region, complementation agreements between 
Brazil, Chile and Argentina, perhaps limited to 
certain industries, would be the equivalent of the 
European Coal and Steel Community. In order 
to enjoy the political support without which they 
have no future, such agreements require the con-
solidation of the democratization processes 
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which are occurring in these countries; they 
could also include Uruguay and Paraguay. The 
necessary ideological solidarity, on the other 
hand, will require a creative effort, especially on 
the part of the intellectual sectors of these 
countries, to redefine in more üniversalist terms 
such apparently national phenomena as Peron-
ism, Radicalism and Varguism. The Right, 
moreover, must not be absent from this scheme, 
although its associations with repressive régimes 
will deprive it of legitimacy for quite some time. 
Without a political Right, however, the entre-
preneurial sectors of these countries will not feel 
that they have sufficient backing to participate 
fully in supra-national projects. 
In addit ion to economic unions among 
countries relatively close to each other there is 
also the prospect of collaboration —perhaps in 
particular among the largest countries of the re-
gion— on specific projects such as that recently 
launched by certain official banks of Mexico, 
Brazil and Argentina for the creation of a multi-
lateral marketing enterprise for capital equip-
ment. 
All these projects imply the creation of large 
economic areas, in which there will be competi-
tion among enterprises of the countries involved, 
though protected to some extent from foreign 
competition. At all events, this question of com-
petition will need considerable supervision, be-
cause of the heavy pressures on each State to 
subsidize its own nationals. These pressures will 
be so strong that they cannot be disregarded, and 
it is better to bring them out into the open and 
make them the subject of negotiation. The situa-
T h e difference between producing a million 
pesos worth of candies or of steel does not reside 
in the amounts exchanged, which by definition 
are equal, nor even in the income they generate, 
which in principle is also equal, although it may 
be differently distributed among the factors of 
production. To assess the real difference it must 
be borne in mind that industry does not only 
tion would be something like what happens in 
Europe with agricultural production, which 
needs to be subsidized. For similar reasons 
—economic, political, cultural and strategic— 
Latin America should subsidize its industries and 
plan its difficult entry into the sphere of regional 
competition. Moreover, the role of these same 
industries in exporting beyond the area must 
certainly be considered (SELA, 1983; SELA, 1984). 
But the first step in escaping from the asphyxiat-
ing atmosphere of the national markets is to get 
used to competing among entrepreneurial units 
which are relatively the same in strength, dimen-
sion, level of technology and capacity for mobiliz-
ing political resources. This need for homogene-
ity is precisely what places limits on the size of the 
projected economic unions. In the southern part 
of the region it is essential that at least Argentina 
and Brazil should take part in the projects, be-
cause of the already considerable volume of their 
trade and particularly because, given the poten-
tial rivalry between these two countries, the suc-
cess or failure of the whole Latin American in-
tegration project depends on their covergence. 
The type of trade to be promoted is not wheat for 
coffee, and much less apples for automobiles, but 
rather products of a similar technological com-
position. This means that within the free and 
competitive area there must be a major sector 
with some kind of regulation. To use a phrase 
that was fashionable in Argentina some years 
ago, candies are not the equivalent of steel, 
although by producing many candies one can 
buy any quantity of steel. But this subject needs to 
be dealt with at somewhat greater length. 
need labour as one of its inputs but that it literally 
generates it. This is because the labour in ques-
tion —including in this term not only manual 
labour but also the administrative, technical and 
management levels— is formed (or its formation 
is consolidated and strengthened) by means of 
work. It is the working situation which promotes 
higher skills, through training on the job, or 
IV 
The extra-economic effects of industry 
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through the individual training that the demand 
for work promotes. But industry does not only 
generate manpower with a certain degree of 
skill: it also entails the creation of a number of 
institutions —businesses, associations represent-
ing these businesses, and the trade unions that 
these make possible. In effect, there will be a 
difference between the iron and steel workers' 
union and that of the candy workersjust as there 
will be a difference between the iron and steel 
entrepreneurs and the owners of the candy 
factories. Care is called for in making these dis-
tinctions, because work is equally honourable in 
any activity, whether at the manual or at the 
technical or entrepreneurial level. Nonetheless, 
from the sociological point of view, the two reali-
ties created in this way —components of social 
classes— will be appreciably different. To begin 
with, the scale of the organization will be very 
different: the complexity of the entrepreneurial 
structure and of the technical services involved 
—including the scientific, cultural and political 
services— will be much greater in the one case 
than in the other. A modern country requires 
techniques of production and organization —not 
only as regards production but also in social and 
cultural matters— that operate on a large scale, 
with a high scientific component and a complex 
division of labour. Perhaps it would be prefer-
able to have a society where activities were on a 
smaller scale, although highly qualified from the 
scientific and cultural point of view : for example, 
computation or electronic services, repair or pro-
duction of specialized components, or artistic 
handicrafts. But this is very different from the 
production of candies, or even of wheat, meat or 
leather. It is true that in these fields also ad-
vanced technologies can be applied, and research 
institutions set up to supply them. But it is very 
difficult to construct on such limited foundations 
(still referring to wheat, meat and leather) a com-
plex division of labour, a rich and varied occupa-
tional structure, and a diversified organizational 
and associative experience. In practice, this does 
not happen, and if this collective experience is to 
be conferred on a country it must be by way of 
industry. Obviously, it is not necessary to pro-
duce absolutely everything, and perhaps steel 
can be dispensed with. In this case, however, 
there will have to be specialization in something 
else that will have the same secondary occupa-
tional and institutional effects as those men-
tioned above. 
In other words, the problem of the division 
of labour must be considered with care, taking 
into account its social aspects and not only its 
economic components in the strict sense of the 
word. The division of work between the en-
gineer, the physician and the musician is dif-
ferent from that which distinguishes any of 
them from the instrument-maker, the nurse, the 
unskilled manual worker or the labourer. The 
first is essential for the progress of a society; the 
second, though also necessary, forms the basis 
for social domination and class privilege. Sim-
ilarly, the international division of labour is one 
thing if some countries produce tractors and oth-
ers cars, or if some make computers and others 
telescopes; but it is quite another matter if some 
produce any of these things and the others pro-
vide shoes, or bread, or minerals, all at low prices, 
or wait to receive the former to entertain them 
during their vacations in hotels and bars. All this 
does not mean that it may not be necessary, or 
inevitable on occasion, for a country to be re-
duced to producing or providing one of these 
things, while hoping to improve its status with the 
passage of time. But in all probability, unless it 
has vigorous political guidance, it will never 
achieve that improvement. Things may even get 
worse if through some combination of circum-
stances, like Argentina or Uruguay, it has ex-
perienced a prosperous version of that paradise 
of the international division of labour based on 
the production of cattle and grain. If that pros-
perity came to grief, it was certainly not due to 
the fact that someone took it into his head to 
industrialize, defying the laws of the in-
ternational market. The market, with its crises, is 
perfectly capable of destroying those artificial 
paradises. The logical answer to these crises is a 
strategy of industrialization, to employ the pop-
ulation which now can find no place in the earlier 
scheme. And here, it is true, many mistakes can 
be made, as certainly happened in various 
countries of our continent. Or perhaps, rather 
than mistakes, one should speak of circum-
stances and crises which made it very difficult to 
apply measures successfully. The primitiveness 
in the technological, entrepreneurial, cultural 
and political fields of a country dedicated to the 
production of a few primary goods augured ill 
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for its future prospects. Other countries in sim-
ilar conditions of primary production, like Aus-
tralia or New Zealand, had more success. It 
would need a more comprehensive study than 
can be attempted here to probe into the causes of 
the difference. But if these countries went ahead 
it was precisely because they abandoned their 
concentration on primary production and be-
came industrialized, assisted to a large extent by 
the stimuli of close involvement in a major war. 
The classic economic theory takes into 
To some extent it is necessary to retrace the road 
of industrialization, protectionism and planning 
which several Latin American countries hesitant-
ly began during the 1930s, continued owing to 
war scarcities in the early 1940s, and then adopted 
by political decision in the postwar years. It was a 
period characterized by populist régimes and 
various forms of democracy with limited 
participation, which in some cases were abruptly 
terminated but in others managed to survive the 
buffetings of an increasing unfavourable in-
ternational climate. On the basis of the ex-
perience accumulated it is necessary to correct 
several aspects which are sufficiently important 
to make the process virtually a new one. 
Although the situation differs from country to 
country, some common elements can be men-
tioned as requisites of this new industrialization: 
i) To begin with, the operations must be on a 
regional scale, or rather subregional, owing to 
the above-mentioned difficulties in generating 
real social forces which will give adequate back-
ing to associations over very extensive areas. One 
of the stifling elements of the earlier stage was its 
limited national setting; it is no accident that the 
countries in which industrialization was most suc-
cessful were Brazil and Mexico, the largest in the 
area. Protection, therefore, should be applied on 
a quasi-continental scale, and there should be an 
attempt to reorient the trade flows within this 
area and to strengthen, among other things, its 
internal means of communication. 
account, to some extent, the type of factors men-
tioned here, when it speaks of external econo-
mies, or of social costs as distinct from private. 
But it does this in a tangential manner, without 
exploring in depth all the aspects of the said 
external economies, particularly the creation of 
complex institutions, ranging from enterprises, 
the public administration, or trade unions to 
political parties, universities and the world of 
culture, which, in the final analysis, develop in 
response to the labour, technical, administrative 
and organizational demands in industry. 
ii) The process calls for the backing of de-
mocratic political systems, with the total 
participation of the population. This dif-
ferentiates such systems from the preceding 
stage, when in many cases the systems were based 
on populist régimes with no particular respect 
for opposition. After the widespread attempts to 
obtain radical change through armed conflict or 
favourable military coups, the leftist and populist 
groups are slowly coming to understand the re-
quisites of democracy, which include, inter alia, 
control over the most extreme or impulsive 
members of their own militants, and the 
abandonment of the illusion that they are the 
only genuine representatives of the people. The 
division of the electorate into competitive 
groups are slowly coming to understand the req-
uisites of democracy, which include, inter alia, 
continue to extend to an increasing number of 
countries. The consolidation of democracy will 
be accompanied, in addition, by greater legitima-
cy and security of ownership and control of pro-
ductive enterprises and of cultural and mass 
communication institutions. Although it is logical 
that possible changes in the system should be 
proposed from different angles, the consolida-
tion of democracy calls for relative moderation in 
the proposals, thus facilitating investment in the 
private sector. 
iii) The State must become more technified 
in order to fulfil its planning role. This, in its 
turn, calls for stability, in order to undertake 
V 
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long-term programmes, which are the only ones 
that can give good results. To control recruit-
ment into the public service and establish the 
system of promotion based on merit implies very 
radical changes in our customs and in the pro-
cedures of political parties. The transformation 
will be assisted if the number of these parties is 
reduced, preferably to two opposing positions. 
This will prevent one of the most serious forms of 
unemployment: that of politicians who head 
small groups doomed to stagnate or survive 
through partisan action or continuous reshuf-
fling of parliamentary majorities. The existence 
of only two or three large parties or permanent 
coalitions acts as a factor that weeds out leaders 
and offers them a more solid career and ex-
perience of team work. 
iv) Industrial promotion should not only be 
based on the direct economic aspects of invest-
ment ("static comparative advantages") but 
should take into account its impact on the in-
stitutional, cultural and university system and on 
the consolidation of highly qualified social strata 
("dynamic comparative advantages"). Because of 
this, the capital goods industry and others of high 
technology should have their place despite their 
apparently high costs. Moreover, the problem of 
the arms industries has to be faced. Although it 
would be desirable to see the world free not only 
from the production but also from the use of 
armaments, the ideal of peace cannot be based on 
the premise that the great dominant centres 
should be Leviathans which monopolize the 
manufacture of elements of destruction. It is true 
that the proliferation of arms ends by promoting 
local wars, such as some going on at the present 
time. But these wars are also a clear example of 
the fact that the main variable lies in the existence 
of aggressive régimes which, if they have money, 
can buy whatever they want. The local produc-
tion of arms will give countries some autonomy in 
the face of the possible confrontations with the 
dominant centres which are to be foreseen 
according to the argument at the beginning of 
this article. 
v) On the ideological plane, supra-national 
identities must be created within a regional 
framework. The specific nationalisms of each 
country, although they may continue to fulfil 
their function, should be integrated into a Latin 
American projection. The same should be done 
with the other ideologies, so that joint action will 
be facilitated, not only through continental 
solidarity, but also through the rapprochement 
of parties and intellectual groups across the 
frontiers. The knowledge of our mutual histo-
ries, traditions and social realities should be made 
a priority aim in our educational programmes, at 
all levels, from primary school to university and 
research activities. 
vi) The countries must prepare themselves 
for collective international political measures. 
These could take the form of cartels of primary 
producers, like that of the oil producers. Copper 
and bauxite are good candidates in this respect. 
There are no quick results to be obtained in this, 
and it takes a long time to prepare the ground for 
these unions, which demand political and ideolo-
gical solidarity going beyond mere economic 
advantages, since otherwise the drive is not suf-
ficient. Collective action can also take the form of 
moderate interventions in conflicts between 
countries of the area and some of the dominant 
centres, such as that which gave rise to the Drago 
doctrine in face of the attempt at the forcible 
collection of the Venezuelan debt. Negotiations 
regarding the external debt will provide more 
and more occasions for this type of activity. 
In completing this list of lines of action we return 
to the problem mentioned at the start, namely, 
the constraint caused by the external debt, which 
robs us of the resources needed for the success of 
the programmes proposed. However, the con-
straint is not total, and a series of measures such 
as those suggested are possible within the limits 
imposed by the present crisis. Since the results 
are bound to be slight and slow, many aspects of 
the situation will continue to get worse and will 
produce explosions of various types in some 
areas, whether in Latin America or in the rest of 
the Third World. These explosions will speed up 
the tempo of history and facilitate the task of 
those who wish to transform, in a moderate and 
negotiated but increasingly radical manner, the 
factors which deny us liberty of action today. 
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